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Abstract 
 
The paper aims to examine the effect of good corporate governance practices on corporate 
transparency and performance of Malaysian listed companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I 
reason for this economic crisis in the East Asian region (Mohammed et al, 2006; 
D'Cruz, 1999; Khas, 2002). Also, the downfall of worldwide corporate giants such as 
Enron, Xerox, Worldcom and Parmalat (to name a few) have left deep scars on the 
corporate world in general. It has been shown that most corporate failures including 
Enron and Worldcom, can be caused by the lack of good c"orporate governance. The US 
accounting scandals hastened the understanding of the wide-ranging effect poor 
corporate governance can have on a country's economy, through the effecls on 
the G..1pital markets. Such incidents have adversely affected public confidence in the 
reliability of corporate reporting. In Malaysia, the scandals in the USA, as well as the 
1997-1998 financial crisE'.'>, have been mnsidered 3.'; a wake-up call to the need for better 
corporate governance and transparenc)' among Malaysian companies. The Malaysian 
corporate landscape has been blemi..:.;hed by a couple of cases of bad corporate 
governance such as Renong, Perwaja Steel and Malaysia Airlines System (rvlAS). 
Poor corporate governance, weak investor relations, a low level of transparency in 
disclosing information by companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia (BMB) or formerly 
known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), and the ineffectiveness of 
regulatory agencies in enforcing legislation in punishing offenders and protecting 
minority shareholders, are all partly blamed as reasons atuibuting to the collapse of 
several Malaysian companies (Mohamad, 2(02). These problems have drawn attention 
to the need to maintain corporate governance standards, increase transparenc)' and 
improve investor relations, while the market regulatory agencies such as the Securities 
Commission (SC) and BMB should press for more effective enforcement of legislation. 
A survey of the investment community and financial intermediaries in Malaysia, 
conducled by The Edge and Bulletin International, a UK-based public relations and 
image management consultant, revealed clear evidence of such problem'>. The 
respondents indicated that increasing transparenc)', improved corporate governance 
and better investor relations helped to increase c.:'1pital inflovl into the country 
(The Edge, 8 June 1998). 
According to Graham et ai. (2002), the cost of poor corporate governance is borne 
heavily by minority shareholders, which is the case in emerging markets like Malaysia 
where many public companies are family owned. One of the ways to improve investor 
confidence is to have good governance practices that may contribute to better financial 
disclosures and more transparent business reporting. According to Frost et al (2002), 
improvements in corporate governance praclices that contribute to better disclosures 
in business reporting in-turn can facilitate greater market liquidity and capital 
formation in emerging markets. As SUCh, corporate governance is of critical importance 
to investors, insurers, regulators, creditors, customers, employees and other 
stakeholders. However, several questions need to be answered: are Malaysian 
companies concerned about corporate governance and transparenc)'? Is good corporate 
governance a prerequisite to good business and market performance? 
Le-e (2003) cites a finding disclosed by KPMG and The Edge (a leading weekly 
business report published in Malaysia) where only 75 companies among more than 800 
companies listed on BMB (which is less than 10 per cent as of 31 December 2002) 
provided a positive economic return, therefore creating value to the shareholders, while 
the rest instead destroyed value. This is supported by Chen et a1 (2004), who are of the 
opinion that in emerging markets, majority shareholders who are closely associated 
2
Jvlo of  
ill
L" r
feL1
ieL1
c. 1 i
i . 
m;i ;1.'
sparenL)T
<
J 1
Pill .
tri
blem..
y
m nn
uL1
.."
sparenL)T
C
ill of 
L1i itl ill
such
y
IRk! 
0
with corporate insiders ac't as if minority investors capital has no opportunity cost. 
Hence, they do not feel obliged to provide a return to the shareholders. 
Recognising the importance of corporate governance and disclosure adequacy, it is 
vital to have a study focusing on developing a framework and benchmarking corporate 
governance practiCE's (imong Malaysian companies. I--Ience, this study atl.empts to find 
out whether good corporate governance practices have a positive relationship with the 
timeliness of reporting, level of disclosure as well as company's performance. The 
findings of this study are important to rel:,TUlators, investors, academics and others who 
contend that good corporate governance is important for increasing investor 
confidence and market liquidity (Donaldson, 2003). With the regulations focusing on 
corporate governance introduced by the Malaysian authorities (as part of 
their corporate governance reform agenda), such as the Report of Finance 
Committee on Corporate ('rlwernance, the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
and Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements, there is a widely held view that better 
corporate govemance is associated with better finn performance. However, the 
evidence is tenuous (LeBlanc and Gillies, 2003). 
The results of our study of 73 good performance companies and 73 bad performance 
companies found that corporate governance fac'tors have a strong predicting power on 
company performance, mainly due to debt monitoring and foreign ownership. 
However. then~ is a significant negative relation behveen audit quality and 
pfdonnance. The results fine! that perJom:ance is not associated with the level of 
disclosure and timely reporting. The results indicate that disclosure and timeliness are 
not significant contributing factors in the relationship bet\veen corporate governance 
and market performance. 
The remainder of this paper is struc'tured as follows. In the next sec'tion, we review 
the literature on internal governance, ownership stnlCture and financing factors as \vell 
as audit quality. The following section provides a discussion on hypothesis 
development which involves the relationship between corporate govemance and 
performance, as well as between corporate governance and transparency. The third 
section e:ll.'"j)lains the methodology used to satisfy the objectives of study. The fourth 
section reports the results of the study, leading to a conclusion, implications and 
limitations of the study. 
Literature review 
Internal governance 
The board of directors is an important component of internal governance that enables 
the ~"olving of agency problems inherent in managing any organisations. The board 
ha.s the pc)\ver to hire, (ire ~md compensate the top-level decision managfrs and to ratify 
and monitor vital decisions. Board of directors are widely recognised as an important 
mechanism for monitoring the performance of managers and protec'ting shareholders' 
interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The Malaysian Code on Corporate ('rlwernance 
(MCCG) (Finance Olmmittee on Corporate Governance, 2(01) also recogni..-;es that good 
corporate governance rests firmly with the entire board of directors and as such, they 
should take the lead role in establishing best practice. 
With regard to the independence of board of directors, it is argued by both agency 
theory and resource dependence theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Pearce and Zahra, 
1992) that the larger the number of non-executive directors (NEDs) on the board, the 
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better they <:.:1.n fulfil their role in monitoring and controlling the actions of the executive 
directors (ED), as well as providing a window to the outside world. The premise of 
agency theory is that NEDs are needed on the boards to monitor and control the actions 
of ED due to their opportunistic behaviour Gensen and Meckling, 1976). Mangel and 
Singh (1993) opine that NEDs have more opportunity for control and face a complex 
web of incentives, stemming directly from their responsibilities as directors and 
augmented by their equity position. Hence, NEDs are considered as the check and 
balance mechanism in enhancing the board's effectiveness. In addition, those who 
share a similar opinion include Fama and Jensen (1983) who argue that outside 
directors might be considered to be "decision experts"; Weisbach (1988) notes that 
NEDs should be independent and not intimidated by the CEO; able to reduce 
managerial consumption of perquisites (Brickley and James, 1987) and they can act as 
a positive influence over directors' deliberations and decisions (pearce and Zahra, 
1992). 
Empirical evidence on the a§ociation between outside independent directors and 
finll perfom1ance is mixed. Studies have found that having more outside independent 
directors on the board improves performance (Daily and Dalton, 1994), while other 
studies have not found a link between independent NEDs and improved firm 
performance (Hennalin and Weisbach, 1991). The point that can be made from these 
studies is that there is no dear benefit to firm performance provided by independent 
I\'EDs. Petra (2005) argues that the mixed results may be reflective of a corporate 
<.:ulture wherein corporate boards are controlled by management and the presence of 
independent NEDs has no discernable impact on management decisions. 
However, other empirical evidence does suggest that independent NEDs do play the 
important role of being a shareholder advocate. For example, studies have shown that 
shareholders benefit more when independent NEDs have control of the board in tender 
offers for bidders (Byrd and Hickman, 1992) and in hostile take-over threat."> (Gibbs, 
1993). Furthermore, Beasley (1996) reports that an investigation commissioned by the 
Tread\vay Commission into the govemance structures of failed fim1s indicates that the 
boards of diret,lors were dominated by management and "grey" directors (i.e. outsiders 
with special tie."> to the t,,(lmpany or management). Beasley (1996) found that 
independent NEDs reduce the likelihood of financial statement fraud. These studies 
indicate that independent NEDs do monitor and control management and this could 
lead to better company performance. 
Another aspet,l of corporate governance that has become a concern nowadays i." the 
"dominant personality" phenomenon (Forker, 1992). The i§ue revolves around role 
duality, that is, when the CEO is also the Chairman of the board. There are two views in 
this issue. Firstly, the proponents of agency theory argue for a separation of the two 
roles to provide essential check and balances over management's performance 
(Argenti, 1976; Stiles and Taylor, 1993; Blackburn, 1994). On the other hand, the 
alternative argument based upon stewardship theory is that the separation of roles is 
not vital, since many companies are well run with combined role." and have strong 
boards fully capable of providing adequate checks. In addition, when the role is 
combined, the CEO may be able to shape the company to achieve stated objet,lives due 
to less interference. Those who advocate role duality are Ei..<;enhardt (1989), Dahya et a1 
(1996), Donaldson and Davis (1991) and Rechner and Dalton (1991). The basis of their 
arguments is stewardship theory, which suggests that managers at,l in the best 
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interests of the finns and shareholders, and that role duality enh.:mces the effectiveness 
of boards. 
As for the as.."ociation between role duality and performance, Abdul Ralunan and 
Haniffa (2003) documented that Malaysian companies with role duality seem not to 
perform as well as their counterparts with separate board leadershjp based on 
accounting performance measurement. Dahya et oJ. (1996) also concluded that the 
market responds favourably to the separation of the roles and that the accounting 
per(onnance of firms with role duality appears to decline. In other words, a separation 
of the role of the Chairman and CEO will help enhance monitoring quality and reduce 
the advantages gained by withholding information, and therefore the quality and 
timeliness of reporting will improve. In looking at the Malaysian context, role duality is 
not particularly common among listed companies although the potential impact on 
disclosure and timeliness and ultimately the effect on performance is considered 
worthy of testing (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
Another important aspect of corporate governance is about the issue of direl'tors 
(regardless of executive or non-executive) who may sit on more than one board 
(cross-directorships). Dahya et aL (1996) suggest that cross-directorships will help in 
making information more transparent as comparisons can be made based on 
knowledge of other organisations. Hence, decisions made at one board may become 
part of the information for decisions at other boards. In adilition, the interlocking of 
CEOs is desirable because of their experience and credibility as peers. This has been 
emphasised by Lorsch and Maciver (1989, p. 27) who assert that "serving on board is a 
way to see how somebody else is doing the same thing". In other words, CEOs join 
other boards and thereby create interlocking relationships specifically to "embed" what 
they are doing (Davis, 1996). 
High management ownership where managers obtain effective control of thefiml 
will be negatively related to firm value because of managemen t entrenchment (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1989). These authors argue tha t managers entrench them.selves by making 
manager-specific investments that make it costly for sh.:1reholders to repl1.ce them. 
According to Wright (1996), the pos.."ible reason is because managers with high levels 
of stock ownership, the potential for undiversified personal we..1.lth portfolios, and the 
potential for entrenchment may elicit management decisions inconsistent with a 
growth-oriented, risk-taking objective of enhancing shareholder value. 
Studies invesl:igatil1g the relationsh ip between finn performance anel managerial 
stock ownership have come up with mixed evidence (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
McOll1nell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). In the USA, studies show 
that the effect of insider ownership to company performance is dependent upon the 
percentage of ownership. For example, Morck et aL (1988) find a positive relationship 
when the ownership is below 5 per cent, but shows a negative relationship when the 
range of ownership is between 5 and 25 per cent. Hiraki et aL. (2003) also provide 
evidence in their study on Japanese fim1s that insider O\'inership is positively related to 
fim1 value and expropriation of finn resources to the detelminant of minority 
shareholders. 
The empirical ambiguity of the relationship is often cited as evidence of a complex 
role of insider ownership. This is because while it aligns the interests of managers and 
shareholders and thus enhances performance, it also facilitates managerial 
entrenchment and adversely affel'ts performance. Himmelberg et al (1999) find no 
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meaningful correlation between marulgerial ownership and performance. However, 
Khanna et al. (2005) provide evidence that the relationship is not spurious as argued by 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) and there is strong evidence that insider ownership 
signiflGI.nt:1y impacts J1nn value. 
La Porta et al. (2000) defines corporate governance as a SFt: of mechanisms through 
which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by corporate 
insiders. The degree of expropriation by insiders depends on the inve.."ltrnent 
opportunities available and the cost of e>'-lJropriation to the finn. Johnson et al. (2000) 
and Durnev and Kim (2003) suggest that insiders expropriate more when the market is 
bad, and take less when the market is good These authors argue that one could 
addres.'l the agency problem between outsiders and corporate insiders by imposing a 
higher cost on ex-propriation by using grm-vth opportunities, exiernal financing and 
concentrated ownership. In short, high insider ownership is normally associated with 
management entrenchment and expropriation of firm rl'_'>ources. 
OwnerslujJ strUl:ture!financ£ng fm:tors 
Shareholders can exercise their influence over the govemance of individml 
corporations both formally, through the proxy system where they can initiate and 
vote on proposals, and informally, through negotiations with corporate management 
(Davis and Thompson, 1994). Researchers consider foreign ownership and debt 
monitoring as part of cor])orate governance because of the influence that they can exert 
on company's marulgement 
Foreign ownership is expected to be one of the ways of technologically upgrading 
fim1s in developing countries. via clirect irnPOlt of new capital and new tt'chnologies 
(Benfratello and Sembenell~ 2002; Kozlov et al., 2000). Another important contribution 
of foreign investment in transition as well as developing economies is potential 
spin-offs of western marulgerial techniques (Kozlov et al., 2000). In addition, 
foreign-owned films increase competition in the market, thus forcing domestic firms to 
restructure faster. Restructuring can take the form of technological improvements and 
improvement in corporate governance, and changes in the range and quality of goods 
produced. 
Kozlov et al (2000) indicate that foreign firms v..-ere fOlmd to be more productive 
than the domestic ones. A number of studies address the relation between performance 
and the presence of foreign owners. Makhija and Spiro (2000) examine the share prices 
of 988 newly privatisecl C7.£ch fimls and f'mel that share prices are positively correlated 
with foreign ownership. Similarly, Boubakri et ai. (2003), in a study of 189 sampled 
finDS in 32 developing countries found that profitability and efficiency gains are 
associated with the presence of foreign owners. This is also supported by Anderson 
et al's (1997) study on Czech privatised companies. Similar results are reported by 
Hingorani et al. (1997), who conclude that insider and foreign ownership mitigate 
agency problems through incentives that align the interests of managers and investors. 
In Malaysia, there has been no empirical evidence published with respect to the 
direct impact of foreign ownership and corporate governance practices. However, it is 
expel1ed that foreign ownership has an indirect impal1 on corporate governance, due 
to the presence of foreign-owned firms that will increase competition in the market, and 
therefore exerting pressure on local firms into having good corporate governance at 
least at par with foreignowned finns. It is hoped thal the presence of foreign 
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ownership as an aspect of governance mechanism would be able to enhance firm 
performance. 
In relation to debt financing, Buslunan et aL(2004) found that board struLlure and 
high ownership are not independent, and that these governance variables are related to 
earnings timeline..">s and organizational complexity. Their study shows that limited 
transparency and complexity of firms' operations are c..'luses of high insider ownership 
concentration. To overcome the agency costs of high ownership concentration levels, 
managers and insiders can show their willingness to be monitored by creditors such as 
banks by increasing their public borrowing (Harvey et ai., 2003; Diamond, 1991). 
Harvey et al. (2003) found that in emerging markets where extreme information 
asymmetry exists between corporate insiders and outsiders, the company uses debt 
borrowed in international markets to signal their willingness to be monitored by debt 
holders. However, following the Asian crisis, Malaysia prohibited currency trading 
and raising debt in developed markets and thus the opportunity to reduce agency costs 
between insiders and outsiders by this means is also unavailable. Therefore, 
domestically issued short-term debt will not discourage corporate insiders from using 
it to further their own entrenched interests, which will only attenuate the agency 
problems between insiders and outside equity shareholders. 
According to SarkaI' and Sarkar (2005), excess cash flows in a fmn will give 
opportunities for self-interested managers to take on projeLls with negative NPV and 
such an "overinvestments" problem reduces the market value of the fim: and impacts 
shareholder value adversely. Hence, given the high agency costs of insider ownership 
and the need for capitaL the poor performance L'ompanies would rely on a larger 
amount of debt financing than the rest. 
Audit quality 
Audit is an important element of efticient equity markets, because audits can enhance 
the credibility oj' financial inionnatiol1. directly SUppOlt better C0l1JOrate govemance 
practices tlu-ough transparent financial repOliing (Francis et al., 2003; Sloan, 2(01) and 
therefore ultimately influences the allocation of re-sources (SEC, 20(0). Theoretically, a 
large public accounting finn with greater investment in reputational capital has more 
reason to minimise audit errors via "auditor-reputation effects" (DeAngelo, 1981; 
Beatty, 1989). In addition, Dye (1993) argues that brge auc]jt firms are inclined to 
supply a higher quality audit compared to small finns, as more wealth is at stake in 
hrgc audit finns. They will also experience a greater loss through reputation damage if 
the quality of their audit does not meet the accepted quality standards. 
DeFond and jiambalvo's study (1993) indicated that large audit finns are more 
independent of management. They found that the (then) Big Eight audit finns 
experienced a greater number of disagreements with former clients than non-Big Eight 
fim's. Therefore, empirical evidence seems to support the differential audit quality 
based on the lype of audit fmn. There are a number of empirical studies supporting the 
positive relationship between audit quality and audit finn size (palrnrose, 19M, 1986; 
Francis and Simon, 1987; jang-Yong jonathan and Lin, 1993; Hogan and jeter, 1997). In 
addition, as argued by Mitton (2002), that as quality audit 1.<; also one aspect of 
corporate govemance, it is expected that 11m,s which are audited by one of Big Four 
audit 11m,s (a proxy for audit quality) will have a better market perfom,ance as well as 
greater transparency. 
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Hypotheses development 
Cor/JOral.e governance and /Jer!ormance 
Corporate governance mechanisms assure investors in corporations that they will 
receive adequate returns on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). If these 
mechanisms did not exist or did not function properly, outside investors would not 
lend to Jirn1s or buy their equity securities. Overall, economic perfonnance would likely 
suffer because many good business opportunities would be missed and temporary 
financial problems at individual finns would spread quickly to other finns, employees 
and consumers. Previous evidence suggests that corporate governance has a positive 
influenc.t' over corporate pe.rformance. For example, based on industry-level view, 
Rajan and Zinga]es (J998) find that fimls in industries that require large amounts of 
extemal financing grO\v faster in countries with high scores on their measures of 
financial development. Thus, corporate governance (measured through better 
accounting standards, stronger legal protection of investors, and a stronger rule of 
law) appears to matter for corporate perfonnance. In addition, Liang Li (1999), 
Williams (2000), Alves and Mendes (2002), Drobetz el at. (2003) and Gemmill and 
Thomas (2004) concluded in their respective studie..-; that there is a positive relationship 
between gooclc'O!1Jorate governance practices and fiml value. 
The above discussion provides a basis to support the argument that there is a 
positive relationship between good corporate govemance practices and firrr. 
performance. This is consistent with the agency theory, where better 
firn1 perfom1ance is achieved clue to the fact tl1at good governance practices provide 
better monitoring and better proteLlion to shareholders. The discussion above leads to 
the hypothesis: 
Hi.	 Other things being equal, stronger internal governance mechanisms lead to 
significant higher tim: perfoffilance. 
H2.	 Other things being equal, higher foreign o'wnership and higher debt financing 
lead to significant bjgher finn perfOlTIlanCe_ 
H3.	 Other things being equal, higher audit quality leads to s~gnificant higher firm 
perfonnance. 
Cor/JOral.e governance and lrrms/Jare-ncy 
Empirical evidence suggests that improved disclosure has a material impaC1 on the 
cost of capital. Greater disclosure and timely reporting is said to reduce the cost of 
equity through lower transaction costs, reduced error in earnings forecasts, or 
higher demand for a company's securities (Euromoney Institutional Investor, 2001). 
Another commonly cited benefit of greater corporate disclosure is that by 
mitigating information asymmetry, it reduces the magnitude of periodic surprises 
about a finn's perlorn1ance and makes its stock price less volatile (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1999). 
As SUCh, strengthened corporate governance and reporting pral1ices, and the 
improved tTedibiliiy of financial infonnation thai \vould result, may not eliminate 
business failure in totality, but could provide the "red flag" signal to the stakeholders 
especially to the regulators. Hence, in line with past studies, the level of transparency 
(through better disclosure and timely reporting) is considered a re..-;ult of good 
governance prac1ice..-; which in turn can help to reduce infonnation asyrrunetry between 
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outsider:;; and corporate insiders, and between institutional shareholder:;; and minority 
shareholders. This leads to the next hypotheses which state: 
H4.	 Other things being equal, stronger internal governance mechanisms lead to 
significant higher level of corporate transparency. 
Hfi.	 Other things being equal, higher foreign ov-rnership anel h~gher debt financing 
lead lo signiflcant higher levf1 of c0l1lorale t.ransparency. 
H6.	 Other thjngs being equal higher audit quality leads to significant higher 
corporate transparency. 
RelationsmjJ between wr/Jorate governance, trans/Jarency and /Jer!onnance 
Corporate governance may have an influence on the level of disclosure (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2(02) as well as timeliness of reporting, especially as it is the board of 
directors that manages information disclosure in annual reports (Gibbins et aL, 
1990). The quantity of information and especially voluntary items disclosed in the 
annual reports and the time the infommtion to be released, are influenced by the 
board of director:;;. Thus, referring back to agency theory, when the board of 
dim..1:ors are independent of the management and observe their responsibility to be 
accountable and transparent to the shareholders or stakeholders, they will disclose 
on time all the relevant information, not just the mandatory ones but also the 
voluntary items. 
In view of the importance of the disclosure factor (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) as well 
as timely reporting (Oh, 2(03) in relation to corporate governance in Malaysia, this 
study attempts to test whether corporate governance practices can predict the level of 
transparency (more specifically the level disclosure and timeliness of reporting). Then, 
in tum, higher level of transparency may be able to positively affect firm performance 
based on the premise that improved disclosure as well as timely reporting may reduce 
cost of capital and mitigate information asymmetry as argued by Euromoney 
Institutional Investor (2001) and Lang and Lundholm (1999). 
As for the relation between transparency and performance, with increased 
voluntary disclosure and more timely reporting (therefore greater transparency) Loh 
(2002) found that finns may gain numerous beneflts, including a better managed 
company, increased management credibility, more long-term investors, greater 
analyst following, improved access to C2pital and lower cost of C2pital, and the 
realisation of a company's true underlying value. Hence, based on this argument, it is 
expected that flnns with a higher level of disclosure and greater timelinp~'-;S in 
reporting will gain better market performance. This leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
H7a,	 Strong corporate governance mechanisms lead to increased transparency. 
H7b.	 InC-Teased transparency leads to significant higher tim: performance. 
Research methodology 
Sam/JIe seJ.ecti(m 
The sample covers 868 companies listed on BMB (formerly known as the KL.')E) as at 
31 December 2002. Seventy·tive of these companies filel the selection criteria by the 
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KPMG/The Edge ranking of the top 75 listed companies by shareholder value creation 
(The Edge, 18 August 2(03). However, only the data of 73 of them were u..<:;eable since 
there is incomplete data for two companies. The 73 companies were used as the 
benchmark for companies with good performance similar to argumen~ made by Peters 
and Waterman (1982) and Lee (2003). The emphasis on shareholder value creation in 
this study is based on the premise that accounting performance measures are not 
necessarily consistent with shareholder value performance (Peters and Waterman, 
1982). Therefore, films \vhich shmv good accounting perfonnance do not necessarily 
create bener value for shareholders. 
In order to compare like with like, the same number of control companies as those of 
the respective companie..<:; set matched by size (total assets) and sec10r on one-tn-one 
basis were selected from the remaining listed companies. This is similar to the selec1ion 
method in Abdul Rahman and Limmack's (2005) study on corporate acquisitions of 
Malaysian listed companies. In order tn selec1 73 companies that will match the good 
performance group, the total as.<:;et figures (from year 2002 annual reports) for all 
companies listed on BMB were collected. Then, for each industrial sec10r, 
the companies were ranked according to their total asset figures. The most 
(mnpara ble company to the good performance b'TOUP company is identified according 
to the neaTest total asset figure in each sector. To identify (mupany performance, 
Tobin's Q is calculated for each film. To take into account the effect of different 
industries which the companies belong to, industry-adjusted Q is calculated tn 
represent the rela.tive perfomlaTlce. Out. of the tota1 146 sample finns, four were 
eliminated as they were considered as outliers, because the Q value of the two of them 
were extremely high (above 1(0), while the remainder recorded negative Q. 
Consequently, the number of usable sample companies was further reduced from 146 
to 142. 
Data colJ.cr:tilm 
The data collected for this study comprises two categories: dependent and independent 
variables. The dependent variable is represented by Tobin's Q. However, in other 
regression analysis, transparency (which consist of two components: timeliness of 
reporting and corporate governance disclosure) is also regressed as a dependent 
variable. Independent variables consist of seven corporate governance characteristics, 
viz. board independence, board leadership or role duality, quality of directors, insider 
ownership, foreign oVvllership, debt financing and audit quality. Table I provides the 
descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables selected in this 
study, as well as their sources of infonnation. Data on total assets, shareholder equity, 
number of ordinary shares, total debts and total liabilities are obtained from company's 
annual report. Share price for each company is obtained from the Daily Diary record 
provided by BMB in its Public Information Centre. Corporate governance variables are 
obtained from companies' annual reports at the then KLSE for the fisca'! year ending 
2002. The year 2002 is chosen for the purpose of observing the effec1 of new Revamped 
KL')E Listing Requirements on corporate governance which were introduced in 2001. 
The new listing requirements require all listed companies to include in their annual 
reports a separate statement on corporate governance. 
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Variables Acronym Operationalisation Source of infonnation 
Board lNED 
composition 
No role DUAL 
duality 
Quality of XDill. 
directors 
Insider lNSlDER 
ownership 
Foreign FOREIGN 
ownership 
Audit quality AUDIT 
Debt to DEBT 
assets 
Timeliness TlIVlELNS 
Disc!ostrre DlSC 
Tobin's q QRATIO 
Company 
size 
Proportion of lNED to toml number 
directors on the board 
Dichotomous: 1 with role duality 
and 0 if no role duality 
The average munber of additional 
directorships of other i\1nlaysian 
PLCs held by the lNED.lt is a proxy 
for director calibre in the external 
labour market 
Percenmge of shares retained by 
inside owners (namely shares isslIed 
to management and dirators) 
Proportion of shares owned by 
foreign shareholder to Total shares 
outstanding 
Smtutory audit fees divided by 
amount of sales 
This is equal to long term debts 
divided by total assets. It is a proxy 
for debt·f.nancir~ 
Nlunber of calendar days taken by 
the company to publish its annual 
report after fiscal year end 
The corporate governance reporting 
score 
lVlarket value of ordinary shares 
plus toml b(x)k value of long-term 
debts divided by net worth (toml 
assets less total liabilities) 
Total asset figw'es are the p!"Oxies 
for company's size 
Company annual reports for 
financial year ending 2002 
Company annual reportc; for 
fmancial year ending 2002 
Company annual reports for 
financial year ending 2002 
J3lVill's online company database, 
retrieved from www.kLc;e-ris.com. 
my 
Investors digest Uune 200~) which 
shows foreign shareholding as at 
~lst December 2002 
Company aml',lal \'epOlt f.)r financial 
year ending 2002 
Company anmml rept).-t. for iin.ancial 
year ending 2002 
J3MJ3's website 
(www.bllrsarnalaysia.com) 
Cornpal~}' anmlal ,eport ior financial 
year ending 2002 
C(lmpany allnual rep<>rt for fjru1.ncial 
year ending 2002 
Company annual \'epolt for financial 
year ending 2002 
Measurements 
In addition to the explanation on the operationalisation given in Table I for each 
variable, these are the variables that require further explanation: 
Economic jmJjit 
In Hils study) simi ];-1Y to Lee (2003), economic profit integrates iJu-ee aspeds of business 
economics that (rrate shareholder value, namely, nrt operating profit after ta..x 
(NOPAT), inveo,ied capital OC) and cost of capital. The NOPAT figures used were 
basically earnings before interest, tax and amortization (EBlTA), less adjusted taxes. 
To compute the Ie of a company, an average of its financial year 2001 closing book 
values of total debt and total equity and its financial year 2002 book values of total 
debt and total equity was used. The cost of capital is calculated based on its specific 
weighted average cost of capital, which, in tum, is derived using the weight each 
company has in terms of its market values of debt and equity. According to the 
publishers of the business newsletter - The Edge, to calculate weighted average cost of 
capital in 2002 the risk free rate used was 3.5 per cent, and the average risk premium 
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added to obtain the expected market rate of return was around 4.5 per cent. The key 
n1f.'lsure by which the companies were ranked in this study was economic profit (or 
residual income), which is EBITA less weighted average cost of capital of Ie. Lee (2003) 
emphasized that "EPIIC" is used because it would remove the distortion caused by the 
difference in company size and could be used to rank companies ba~-ed on economic 
profit.s. 
Audit quality 
Even though there are various factors studied that represent audit quality, it seems 
tb~lt the most commonly studied fartor related to audit qual ity is audit finn si7R. 
Previous studies document that Big Four (or their precursor:-;) auditor:-; charge higher 
audit fees, spend more time on audits, and have fewer lawsuits than non·Big Four 
auditors, implying that Big Four auditor:-; provide higher quality audits than non-Big 
Four auditors (DeAngelo, 1981; Francis and Simon, 1987; Palmro,se, 1988, 1989). Even 
after control1ing audit risk, client size and audit complexity, there is an additional 
premium based on auditor identity (Wooten, 2(03). Based on the arguments that audit 
fee can also reflect the level of audit quality (as argued by Shapiro: 1983; Ferguson et al, 
2005; Venkataraman et al., 2(05) and that there is a positive association between audit 
firm size and audit fee, this simiy excludes audit firm size fTom the correlation and 
regression analysis. Instead, similar to Che Haat et aL's (2005) study on Malaysian PN4 
companies[l], the ratio of audit fee to R.M100 of sales is used, as the data is continuous 
and is expected to provide more robust results compared to the dununy variable used 
for audit firm size. 
Dz~~closure index 
The disclosure index reporting model developed in the current research is based upon 
fadors identified in national and intem~itional best practice guidelines and other 
research studies[2]. The model considers objec1ive factor:-; based on publicly disclosed 
information. Corporate governance factors are generally divided into two main 
categories: basic corporate governance variables are those items specifically identified 
by the Code, and quality corporate governance variables are value-added items 
generally proposed by other best prac1ices worldwide. It is important to note that the 
ultimate objec1ive of this corporate governance rating exercise is to encourage the 
firms to uphold the "substance over [am:" princip Ie of govern;mce rather than merely a 
"box-ticking" process of compliance with statutory regulation. 
In this study, unlike the self-assessment questionnaire designed by the Forum for 
Corporate Governance in Indonesia (2003), and the voluntary disclosure index by 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), and the corporate governance questionnaire used in 
Saldana's (2000) study (which only provided a dichotomous scale of a "yes" or "no" 
options), the checklist is designed so that every individual disclosure is evaluated 
based on a five point of Likert scale. We IDf..Clsured the level of corporate govemance 
reporting based on the extent to which companies disclose the relevant information in 
their annual reports. The list classifies the contextual factors into eight major groups 
that simultaneously emphasize the prac1icability and world-class quality of reporting 
goals. However, to keep our disclosure index comparable to those used in prior studies, 
we focused only on the accountability and transparency measures, which include both 
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voluntary and mandatory disclosure requirements that are accounting related 
(Appendix). 
Thnelines.\' 
BMB's latest Revamped Listing Requirements (January 2(01), paragraph 9.23, requires 
listed companies to submit the annual repons within a period not exceeding 6 months 
from the close of the fiilll.ncial year of the listed issuer. In addition, companies are also 
required to submit the interim repons, i.e. qua11erly repon not later than two months 
after the end of each quarter of the financial yc.:'U'. 
For the purpose of this study, the date of the submis."ion of the annual repon is the 
reponing event used. Similar to the operationalisation used by Syed Ahmad and 
Mohd Zaini (2003), the annual repon submission date is selected because of the 
imponant role played by the company's repon as a valuable communication tool to 
users of the infonnation, and the fal'1: that the release of the annual repons are 
imponant events as required under the Companies Act (1965) and guidelines issued by 
the semrity Commission and the KLSE. Thus, timelines." is measured in tenns of the 
time interval (in number of caJendar days) between the ftscaJ year-end and the elate of 
announcement of the annual repon submis...,ion made to BMB. 
Tobin's Q 
Tobin's Q is used in this study as a proxy for market rerum. Tobin's Q compares the 
market value of the tlrm ,vith the replacement cost of the finn's assets. It also implies 
that the greater the real rerum on investment, the greater the value of Q. The 
methodology used to calculate Tobin's Q is based on Lindenberg and Ross (1981), Lang 
et al (1989) and Vogt (1994)- The firm's market value is rrw.asured by the market value 
of ordinary shares plus the market value of long-tenn bonds and the book value of 
preference shares. The market value of the ordinary shares is estimated by multiplying 
the number of ordinary shares by the share price at the end of the fiscal year, while the 
debt value of alll,lmpanies L.<; equal to the total book value of all long-term debt. The 
market value of debt could not be obtained because all these companies had obtained 
private loans, for which information was not available. Similar to Weir et al (2002), the 
denominator was measured as net worth which is total assets less total liabilities. The 
total assets and liabilities were detennined from the annual repons. 
Stati~tical {malys1s 
All the data were analysed using the statistical package for social science (SPS..S) 
version 12.0. Based on the above discussion, independent variables comprise the 
percentage of independent non-exemtive directors (INED) on the board, average 
number of cross-directorship among INED, role duality, insider ownership, foreign 
ownership, debt-to-asset ratio and audit quality. The level of disclosure and timely 
reporting are the variables that repre."ent transparency. The dependen t variable is also 
represented by Tobin's Q as a measure of market perfonnance. Furthermore, multiple 
regression models (based on three dependent variables - Tobin's Q, Attribute 5 of a; 
Reporting Score (disclosure) and timeliness) are used to determine which of the 
hypothesised explanatory variables affect the likelihood of a finn in a'eating good 
performance, and whether corporate governance mechanisms affel'1: the level of 
disclosure and timeliness of reporting. 
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Results 
The data analysis is to test whether corporate governance mechanisms are significant 
predic1:ors of market performance, and whether the level of transparency is a 
signific;mt predictor in the relationship ben.vf-en corporate governance variables and 
market performance. In brief, Hi to H3 states that corporate governance mechanisms 
lead to higher market performance, while H4 to H6 state that corporate governance 
mechanisms lead to higher level of transparency. 
Multiple regression was used to test all the hypotheses which are related to 
corporate governance anributes, disclosure, timeliness and market performance. 
Several assumptions in regre...,sion analysis have been tested to ensure that there is no 
significant multicollinearity between the independent variables; that the variance of 
the distribution of the dependent variable is the same for all value.'> of independent 
variables (homocedastic1ty); that a linear relationship exists between dependent and 
independent variables (linearity); that the distribution of values of the dependent 
variable for each value of the independent variable is normal (normality) and that no 
errors related to measurement and specification exL.<;t Nlulticollillearity was tested 
based on the correlation matrix. According to Pallant (2001), multicollinearity exists 
when the independent variables are highly correlated (r = 0.9 and above). The results 
of the test: indicate that all thp correlation coefficients between the independent 
variables are Ie:>.'> than 0.9. An analysis of residuals, plots of the studentised residuals 
against predicted values is conduc1:ed to te."t for homocedastic1ty, linearity and 
normality assumptions. As recommended by Pallant (2001), observations with 
studentised residuals of more than 3.00 are omined from the analysis. Furthermore, 
normality tests based on skewness, kurtosis and Ko!mogorov-Smimov or K-S. 
Lilliefors were also conduc1:ed. Transformation is undertaken for both independent and 
dependent variables when it doe." not meet the assumptions of normality. For example, 
Tobin's Q, total assets, average number of cross-directorship held by INED, 
percentage of foreign ownership are transformed into Log while fiml age was 
transformed into square root The selection of method of transformation is based on the 
shape of distribution depiC1:ed by histogram, as suggested by Tabachnik and Fidell 
(1996). 
The data were analysed by multiple regression using seven different independent 
variables (which are grouped into three categories) on 142 companies. The first 
category is the internal governance factors consisting of four variables namely 
composition of INED on board, no role duality, quality of directors and insider 
mvnershjp. The semncl category is ownership structure/financing factors which 
comprising of foreign QVvnership and debt financing. The third category contains the 
variable of audit quality that represents an external governance mechanism. The initial 
sample consisted of 146 companies, however, for the purpose of regression analysis, 
four companies with extreme Tobin's Q were omitted from the analysis, thus making 
up 142. Four separate regression models were run, Tables II-V, panel.., A, B, Cand D, 
individually summarise the regression results. 
Table II (panel A) demonstrates the regression results for the relationship between 
the corporate governance factors and market performance (measured by Tobin's Q). 
The regression produced an adjusted R 2 of 0.392. The results show that company's 
economic profit (a.." published by Lee, 2003) ha.." a significant positive influence over 
market performance. Three corporate governance variables were found to be 
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Variables Model 1 r-.'1odeI2 Model 1 
Constant 
Finn age 
Emt:omic ;),olit
Size . 
0.016 (0.26.9) 
- 0.014 (- 0.812) 
0.:n4 ,,'," (5.814) 
- 0.007 (- 0.129) 
- 0.114 (- 0567) 
- o.on (- 0.751) 
0.11Z""" (i604) 
- 0.009 (- 0.171) 
- 0.600 (- 2.10:)) 
0.000 (0.009) 
0.122 " ,. ,. (6,:)42) 
- 0.001 (- 0.101) 
iVlain effects 
Internal mechanisms 
lNED 0.207 (0.719) 0.044 (0.178) 
Cross·diret-1:orship 0.017 (0.471) 0.008 (O.llZ) 
No role duality O.01Z (0.115) - 0.024 (- 0.264) 
lnsider 0.001 (0.769) 0.001 (0.871) 
(lwnershipHinal,cil1g 
Fore~~ 0.027" (1.76;")) 
Debt·to·asset 0.6.% ,,"" (6.210) 
Audit quality - 0.088"" (- Z586) 
N 0.470 0.481 0.661 
Change in R 2 0.221 O.Oll 0.206 
N2 0.221 0.211 0.417 
Adj. R i.' 
I'~statistic chang'e 
0.201 
1Z.;)41 "** 
0.189 
0.444 
0.192 
15.1:i7"" ,. 
I)f 1,1:14 7, no 10,127 
Notes: 1. log_QRAT10 = u: + {31 sqrCAGE + (3Z EconP + f31Iog_A5.SET + ~;; 2. IO!LQRAI10 
= (X + 131 sqrcAGE + fJZ EconP + 131 log_ASSET + f34 lNED +; /fi logJ(l)lR + il6 ROLEDLJAL 
+ f37lNSIDER +~;;1.log_QRAT10 = u: + 131 sqrt_AGE +f3ZEconP+ j31log_A..SSET + j34lNED+; 
f3:") logYDlR + il6 ROLEDLJAL + /37 lNSIDER + /38IogjORElGN + ffJ DEilT + 1310 ALJDlT + ~;; 
perfonnance is measmed by Tobin's {J;N = 14Z; "sigl1mcar.t at the 0.10 level; ,,', significant at the 0.05 
le\'el; ,,', "signmcant at the O.0llevel 
signifiGUlt foreign oWTlershjp, debt: -to asset and audit quality (significant at ] 0per cent, 
1 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively). All the internal governance mechanisms in the 
analysis do not have significant influence on firm pedonr~ance. In addition, the 
significant relation bt:'tween debtto-asst:'t and performance also indicates that market 
is more confident with the monitoring by finns' creditors. The significant positive 
relation between foreign ownership and performance is consistent with theory 
suggesting that foreign investor ownership is positively associated with good 
perfonnance companies. The results also support the research that shows that the 
presence of foreign investors in a firm arc associated with higher profitability (Smith 
et at, 1997; Claessens and Djankov, 1999) as weU as greater efJiciency resulting irorn 
higher managerial talent, access to advanced technology, and entry into more lucrative 
products and capital markets (D'Souza et al, 2(01). 
Table IT (panel A) also shmvs that there is significant negative relation between 
aud it fee and fmn pedorrnance, which means that poor perfommncefirrns pay 
relatively higher audit fees when compared to good perf0I111anCe finns. This suggests 
that poor performance finns rely on higher audit services to improve their 
perfonnance. This could be because audit quality is an import;mt factor influencing the 
business conduct of poorly managed companies which in turn improves their 
performances. Overall, the significant Fstatistic change in Model 3, Table II (panel A) 
indicates that there 1.,-; evidence to support H2 that states higher foreign ownership and 
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Variables Modell Model 2 Model J 
C()n~tant 41.679""" (19.406) J7.JOJ ",." (11519) J7.1JO" ,.• (7.770) 
Firm age - 0.J91 (- L419) - 0.404 (- L417) - 0.467 (- L;)(}.')) 
Economic profit -0.4;)6 (-0517) - 0.07;) (- 0.084) - 0.2:');') (-0.274) 
Size 0.600""" (1.7JJ) 0.7;');) ,,,. (2.099) 0.810" (Ln7) 
Main ejjeds 
Internal mechanisms 
lNED 10J66 • ,. (2.2:>8) 11.1;)9 *" (2.409) 
Cross-directorship - L6]) (- 1.28.1) - L667 (- 1.288) 
No role duality 0.216 (OJJO) 0.;)40 (0.J18) 
Insider 0.007 (0.J46) 0.007 (0.:146) 
()wlle.shipifn3ncin,l'; 
Foreign OJ6J (0_;)70) 
Debt-to-asset - L928 (- 0.9JO) 
Audit quality - 0.002 (- O.OOJ) 
N. OJ61 0.2:')9 0.27;) 
Change in N. 2 0.026 0.041 0.009 
N.;: 0.026 0.067 0.076 
Adj. N.:< O.om 0.019 O.om 
Fstati~tic change 1.281 L490 O.40J 
Of J,1:19 7,n') 10,1:12 
Notes: L DISG = a + f31 sqrt_AGE + ~2 EconP + (3J log_AS-.SCr + f:; 2. DlSG = cr + f31 
sqrtjGE + [r2 EconP + I-n log_ASSET + f34 INED + f3;') jog_XDIR +; 136 ROLEDlJAL + f37 
INSiDER + f;; J. DlSG = a + 131 sqrt_AGE + f32 EconP + 13J log_AS-.SET + 134 INED + f3;,) 
log_XDlR +; ll6 ROLEDlJAL + f37 lNSlDER + 138 log_FOREIGN + f39 DEllT + f310 AlJDlT + f;; 
dischmre level in this regression is measmed by the score for Attribute;) of CG Rep,)rting Score while 
performance measme used is Tobin's 0, N = 142; "sigl1mcant at the 0.:0 level; "'·si.gnificant at the 
o.m leve~ ,,', "signific:ar.t at the o.m level 
higher debt financing lead to significant higher fum performance. However, the results 
suggests that there is no support for HI and H3, which state that stronger internal 
governance mechanisms lead to significant higher fim1 perionnance, and higher audit 
quality leads to significant higher fim1 perfonnance. 
Table III (panel B) depicts the second regression re..-:ults, which serve to examine the 
as..,-;ociation between corporate governance factors and disclosure. The regression 
produced an adjusted R 2 of only 0.005. This table shows that all the selected corporate 
governance factors do not signific..1.ntly predict the level of disclosme. 
Table IV (panel C) shows the third regression results for the relationship between the 
corporate governance factors and timeliness of reporting. The table shows that the 
adjusted R 2 is 0.008 and only intemal govemanee mechanisms significantly contribute 
to higher market perfonnance. The implementation of split roles of Chairman and CEO 
shows a marginaIly si,s'Djficant associa bon with timeliness (at 10 per cent level). Looking 
at the coefficient, lhe table shows that there is a negative relationship between I:\"ED 
and timelines..-:. As timeline..-:s is measured by number of days taken for a company to 
publish its annual report, the negative sign means that companies with split roles take 
les..,-; time to publish their annual rep<.1l1s, therefore, there is a positive association 
between no role duality and timeliness. However, both Tables III (panel B) and IV 
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Variables Modell I\lode12 Model 3 
Com,tant - 3.977 (- 0.072) - 24.262 (- 0.294) - 109.384 (- 0.899) 
Finn age 4.2L1 (059:» 4.112 (056:» 6.714 (0.850) 
Economic profit 22.299 (0.984) 19.794 (0.$1) 24.08-1 (1.016) 
Size - 6.525 (- 0.733) - 6.3;)6 (- 0.693) - 0.870 (- 0.073) 
f\t!ain effects 
Internal mechanisms 
lNED 1ll.215 (0.969) 100.041 (0.R4R) 
Cross·dira:ton;hip 42.243 (1.299) 39.3ll (1.192) 
No role duality - 73.440 ,. (- 1.732) - 77.46.1 * (- 1.789) 
Insider 0.768 (1523) 0.731 (1.416) 
(lwnershipliilliJI'cil,g 
Fore~gn - 1.797 (- 0.247) 
Debt·to·asset 4,1543 (0,82;)) 
Audit quality - 1;;'788 (- 0.990) 
N 0.102 0.2:)9 0.279 
lnange in N 2 0.010 0.057 0.011 
N 2 0.010 0.067 0.07R 
Adj. N;- - 0.01l O.OlR 0.008 
Fstatistic change 0.479 2.m.l * 052;) 
Df 3,13.9 7,13:> 10,132 
Notes: 1. IOjLTIME = a + {31 sqrCAGE + f32 EconP + 133 log_As..C:;LT + f;; 2. IOjLTlIVlE 
= a + {31 sQrt_AGE + f32 EconP + f33 lOiLASSET + ,B4 lNED + Wi !ojLXDJR +; 136 ROLEDLJAL 
+ I'll lNSIDER + f;; 3. IO~LTlI\'lE = IX + ,Bl sQrt_AGE + 132 EconP + f3.1 !ofLAs..C:;ET + f34 lNED 
+ fJ5 IO~LXDJR + 136 ROLEDLJAL + f37 lNSIDER + f38lo~U'OREIGN + f39 DE13T + f3l0 ALJDfr + f;; 
~rfonnance memmre used in ~~,i~ regression is Tobin's Q; N = 142; "significant at the O.LO level 
slgmficant at the O.O'J level;' significant at the 0.01 level 
(panel C) indicate that corporate governance mechanisms do not seem to predic1 higher 
level of transparency and therefore, there is no support for H4, H5 and H6 which, 
respectively, state that stronger intemal govemance mechanisms lead to significant 
higher level of corporate transparency; higher foreign ownership and higher debt 
financing lead to si.!,1J1iflcant hight'T level of corporate transparency; and, higher audit 
quality leads to significant higher cOl1Jorate transparency. 
Furthermore, H7a states that when corporate governance mechanisms are strong, 
transparency is increased, and in turn, the increased transparency could lead to higher 
performance as stated by H7b. Table V (panel D) demonstrates the relations between 
all the corporate governance fac1ofS, disclosure and timeliness regressed against 
company performance. It was found in the regression for the fourth model that the 
inclusion of disclosure and timeliness into the regression only contributed marginally 
to change to R 2. The fourth model also shows that its F-statistic change is 
not signific..1.nt which mea.ns that the inclusion of disclosure and timeliness does not 
significantly contribute to better firm peliorn:ance. This mea.ns that there is no support 
for H7a and H7b either. 
Based on the four regressions, the overall results can be summarised in Figure l. 
The diagram in Figure 1 shows that for Ix)th disclosure and timeliness variables, 
corporate governance fac10rs do not predict the level of disclosure and timeliness 
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Variables lVlodel1 rVlode12 Mndel3 1\1odel 4 
Constant 0.036 (0.26.9) - 0.114 (- 0.567) - 0.600 ".' (- 2.:mii) - 0.714 .'* (- 2.274) 
Finn age -0.014 (-0.832) - O.OB (- 0.751) 0.000 (0.009) o.om (0.167) 
Economic profit 0.:514 "','.' (5.814) 0.312 " ,," (5.604) 0.322"""' (6,:>42) 0.329 " .'" (6.6.19) 
Size - 0.007 (- 0.329) - 0.009 (- 0.371) - 0.003 (- 0.101) - 0.006 (- 0.229) 
IVlain effects 
Jnternal mechanisms 
lNED 0.207 (0.739) 0.044 (0.178) 0.039 (0.155) 
Cross-dira:torship 0.m7 (0.471) 0.008 (0.112) 0.022 (0.3B) 
No role duality 0.032 (0.315) - 0.024 (- 0.264) - 0.042 (- 0.465) 
Jnsider 0.001 (0.769) O.lJ01 (0.871) 0.001 (0.9:i5) 
OwnershipifEancing 
Fore(~ 0.027* (1.76:» 0.027"' (1.740) 
Debt-to-asset 0.69:i ""* (6.210) 0.708""" (6.293) 
Audit quality - 0.088" * (- 25M) - 0.091 *"" (- 2.675) 
Disclos1.lfe 0.003 (0.:>41) 
Timeline;s 0.000 (- 1.2:>1) 
I( 0.470 0.481 0.661 0.667 
Change in 1(2 0.221 0.011 0.206 0.008 
I( ? 0.221 o.:m 0.437 0.445 
Adj. I(? 0.203 0.189 0.392 0.391 
Fstatistic change 12.:>41 ,,"', 0.444 15.357""·" 0.840 
ill 3,134 7, BO 10,127 12,125 
Notes: 1. log_QRA'no = a +.81 sqrt_AGE +f32 EconP +lnlog_As..C;ET +f;; 2. lO/LQRAI10 
= a + 131 sqrt_AGE + {J2 EconP + rn log_As..C;ET + J34 lNED + {3;> log_XD!R + 136 l{OLEDlJAL 
+ffl lNSJDlli + f; 3; log_QRATJO = (t + {31 sqrt_AGE + {12 EconP + f3,11og_As..C;ET + {34 lNED 
+ 135 IO~LXD!R + 136 l{OLEDUAL + (37 lNSJDlli + /38 lO/LFOH.EIGN + (39 DEBT + /310 AlJDff 
+ f:; 4. lOILQRATJO = a + [31 sqrcAGE + {32 EconP + /331n/LAs..C;ET + {34 lNED + /35 lO/LXD!R 
+ 136 l{OLEDlJAL + {37 JNSIDEl{ + f38 log_FOruGN + fJ9 DWT + f310 AUDJT + /311 OlSG + 
(312 log_'l1ME + f:; N = 142; "signif-icanl al the 0.10 level; ""sigl1ii1(:a.nt at the 0.05 I<,vel; 
.,.' "sigl\ificaEt at the 0.01. it'vd 
~,----DiScl_OSl\feI~ 
lnsignijicanl In.~ignijicanl 
(TaMe III PmlCl B) (TaMe V Panel D) 
Corporate SignificanlGovernance 1-----(TaMe 2 Panel A)-----.lFactors 
lnsignijicanl lnsignijicanl 
(TaMe TV Pan ..l C) (TaM.. V Panel D) 
~ Timeliness 1/
'-----­
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of repolling. Instead, the direct relationship between corporate governance factors and 
pelformance is statistically significam. 
From this analysis, the overall results indicate that practising good corporate 
governance is an important factor that influences fmn market performance (me.asw-ed 
by Tobin's Q). This is shown by the adjusted R~! of 0.392 in the t1rst regression model, 
which indicates that 39.2 per cent of the variation in Malaysian listed companie..<; l'-; 
explained by the independent variables. The two major contributing factors that 
significantly influence firnl Inarket perforn131Ke are debt. financing and foreign 
ownership. However, there is a s~gnificant negative association between audit quality 
and performance, \villi poor firms using more audit: services than good firms. 
Testing the robustness of anlllYS1~' - sjJ/:it dala analysis 
In order to test the robustness of the earlier regression analysis, the data is regressed 
again but at this stage the companie..,-; are split into good and poor performance based on 
the matched pair basis introduced earlier. The results are shown in Tables VI (panel E) 
up to IX (panel II). Table 'VI (panel E) Model 2 shows that., consistent with the findings 
from the earlier regression analysis, the effecl of internal governance mechanisms on 
both the good and poor perfonnance companies is insignificant. This gives an 
indica tion that the market does not value internal governance mechanisms 
implemented within the companies. It might also highlight the way companies 
respond towards the Code's recommendations, which is possibly more w "box-ticking" 
rather than taking the "substance" of it. In addition, the neg-ative association of audit 
quality and performance is stronger to the good performance companies illustrated in 
Model 3, Table VI (panel E) where the coefficient tor audit quality is - 0.080 (significant 
at 10 per cent level) and -0.082, respectively, and 0.570 and 0.756 (both are signiflcani 
at 1per cent level), respeclively, for debt-wasset. This implies that good do not consider 
high quality audit service as an important governance mechanism w anain higher 
performance, although the companies with relatively poorer performance consider 
external audits (similar to the findings from Ashbaugh and Warfield, 2003; Che Haat 
et al, 2(05) and debt financing as an effective tool to bring back their companies to 
better performance. 
Moreover, when disclosure and timeliness are included in the regression against 
market performance (Table VJ] (panel F)), F-statistic change again does not show a 
s~gnificant outcome which means that corporate transparency is not the main concern 
of the market in assessing fim1 perforn1alKe. To examine whether the effect of 
corporate governance mechanism to disclosure and timeliness is different between the 
good and poor performance companies, the results in Tables vm (panel G) and IX 
(panel H) reveal that there is no evidence showing that corporate governance 
mechanisms have a significant dfed on disclosure and timeliness for both good and 
poor performance companies. This might indicate that there is ab.'o an "expeclation 
gap" between the contents of annual reports presented by Malaysian companies and 
the way the market uses the information found in the annual reports. Perhaps, annual 
reports are seen to be les..,-; effeclive in conveying useful information to the users or that 
the users consider other sources of information about the companies as more reliable 
and trusted. The other pos.."ibility is that investors in Malaysia may not refer to 
fundamental corporate information as a basis in making their investment decisions, 
and instead tend to be influenced by speculations in doing w. 
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In other words, the results from the split data regres..<.;ion analysis are consistent with 
the main analysis mentioned earlier. Apart from supporting the results provided by the 
main analysis, it also reveals further u....,eful results, for example showing that the effect 
of corporate governance in forms of high audit quality and monitoring by creditors 
through debt financing are stronger to the poor perforn,ance companies as compared to 
good performance companies. 
Discussion 
In view of the emphasis by the Malaysian government on good corporate governance 
practices, the role of this study is to explore the fac'tors that cause poor pertormance 
companies to destroy value instead of creating value for their shareholders. In 
particular, this study investigates how the corporate governance mechanisms 
including weak disclosures, poor timeliness of reporting and poor debt management 
may have raised "red flags" to the stakeholders, bringing about intense scrutiny that 
could help reduce the agency costs to debt holders and equity holders. In order to make 
a comparison, using a sample of 73 good performance companies based on shareholder 
value creation (Lee, 2(03), and 73 comparable poor performance companies over the 
year 2002, this stlldy invf'Stigates the governance mechanisms, financing strategies, 
audit quality, disclosures and timeliness which may determine the good from the poor 
pertormance companies. 
This study anempts to examine the effet.1: of internal governance mechanisms, 
financing factors/ownership structure and audit quality on disclosure, timeliness and 
company performance. The estimated equations based on the 142 sample companies 
strongly indic..'1.te that corporate governance matters for the performance of firms in the 
market, even though the internal governance mechanisms do not have a strong 
influence on company periorrnance. The results show that debt-w·asst't and audit 
quality have a significant influence over the finl1's market performance. This suggests 
that the external audits serve as an important governance mechanism for creditors, 
paliicularly to ensure that poor per[onnance finns with high level of debt practise good 
debt management which ultin1ately helps them improve their financial condition. 'This 
is similar to the findings made by Mohammed et al (2006). The signific..'1.nt relation of 
debt-to-asset to pertormance supports the theory that debt is an important mechanism 
for solving agency problems in corporations charac'terised by the separation of 
ownership and control in Malaysia (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 
1990; Hart and Moore, 1995). 
However, when the corporate governance variables are regressed against the 
level of disclosure and timeliness of reporting, the results indicate that corporate 
governance mechanisms do not influence disclosure and timeliness of reporting. 
Moreover, when disclosure and timelines...., are included in the regres....,ion against 
market performance, the results do not show a significant relationship. This means 
that transparency is not the main concern of the marl(et in rJ...-;sessing finn 
pertormance. Therefore, this study does not provide evidence to show the 
relationship that corporate governance mechanisms lead to greater corporate 
transparency and there is also no evidence that transparency contributes to better 
film perfonnance. 
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Conclusion 
The possible reason for "ineffectiveness" of other reported internal governance 
mechanisms in differentiating the performance of companies is due to the effect of the 
MCCG. The Code was introduced and became effective in 2001, almost one year before 
the cut off date of the data used in this study. As a result, this study fails to provide 
evidence that internal governance mechanisms may contribute to bener company 
perfonnance because most companies probably has implemented the recommendations 
of the Code (as suggested by Eow et al., 2003). Tht'refore, thert' is no significant diHt'rence 
between good and poor performance companies insofar as internal governance is 
concerned. This is contrary to tl1t' findings of Leng and J\lansor (2005) and Abdul 
Rahman and Haniffa (2003) who found that internal governance such as role duality has 
a positive effect on performance. This could also be because of the difference in the 
measurement used to represent perfonnance in this study. Unlike their studies which 
use purely accounting perfonnance (ROE as the variable), this study uses economic 
profit (represt'nting tht' level of shareholdt'r value creAtion) suggested by Lee (2003). 
In addition, this study introduces variables of disclosure and timeliness in its 
resp.arch LTamework in order to dt'tennine whether rnarkt't pt'rtonnance is influenced 
by the level of corporate transparency. Therefore, one of the contributions of this 
study is to examine whether higher market performance is also due to greater 
transparency resulting from good governance practice. The insignificant effect of 
transparency indicates that, in contrary to the theoretical argument by Loh (2002) who 
suggests that corporate governance may impact transparency and consequently lead 
to better market perfoilllanCe, this study reveals that tram;parency is not a significant 
factor that determines the relationship between corporate governance factors and the 
market perfonnance of a company. 
Tht' findings from this study show that tl1t're is no relationship between tht' level of 
disclosure and market performance, might lead to the question of disclosure 
framework in Malaysia. The problem with the framework could be due to investors 
still being unable to have equal access to disclosed infonnation, or that some investors 
might have had the infonnation earlier than the others. In addition, the contents of the 
infonnation disclosed might have not catered to the needs of investors. There might 
also be certain fundamental information that is lacking in the Malaysian disclosure 
framework. In their criticisms pertaining to this matter, Standard and Poors (2004) 
revealed that most of the companies in Malaysia still fell short of global disclosure 
practice (Standard and POOfS, 2004; Toll, 2(04), and the current study reinforces their 
point of view. In other words, there is still inadequate disclosure on corporate 
governance practices which is mandatory under the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirements, let alone other voluntary infonnation such as business ethics and 
responsibility, intellectual capital, reviews of vision, mission and goal statements, as 
mentioned in this study. 
In short, corporate governance does matter to Malaysian listed companies, even 
though monitoring through internal mechanisms seem"> to be relatively ineffective. 
The contribution of this study is that it shows the importance of good corporate 
governance mechanisms for debt holders and minority shareholders in emerging 
markets. Stakeholders can phy a role in reducing agency cost by monitoring "red flags" 
of weak corporate governance mechanism.." for example, poor debt management and 
low audit quality. 
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hnplications of the study 
The i~sue of tran~parency (in which di~closure and timely reporting are part of) is with 
regard to the perception of the stakeholders towards the usefulness of annual reports 
and other sources of information about companies. The findings from this study show 
that there is no relationship between corporate governance factors and transparent:y, 
and there is also no relationship between transparenc...)' and company performance. 
This might indicate that there is an "expectation gap" between the contents of annual 
reports pre;ented by Malaysian companies and the way the investors use the 
information found in the annual reports for their inve;unent decisions. Perhaps, annual 
reports are seen to be less effective in conveying useful information to the users due to 
the disclosure of information that is no longer relevant to them, or that current users 
demand more £rom the contents of annual reports. The Other possibility is that it might 
be due to the users who consider other source; of information about the companies as 
more reliable, tmsted and easily accessible relative to the film's annual reporl<;. The 
fact that investors do not rely on annual reports to make financial decisions may 
worsen the problem of "information asynunetry", since insiders may take advantage of 
having access to internal information. Thus, it is important for the regulators such as 
the SC or BMB to educate the investors, so that they will be able to look at the 
fundamentals of a company rather than solely rely on speculation in making 
inve;tment decisions. 
This study also highlights foreign O'A-11ership as one of the most signific.."lnt 
predic...'tors to market perfoffi1ance. This indicate; that foreign investors have an 
influential role in aJiecling the performance of companies part.iOlhlIly becauSC' of their 
better skills in selec...'ting good companies to invest in. When compared to local 
inve;tors, foreign investors seem to be relatively more critical in making business 
decisions and tend to look at the fundamentals of a company's governance and 
performance. Therefore, there is a basis for the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia 
(as quoted in the New Strait, Times on 26 July 2(04) calling local inve;tors to take the 
lead in investing in the country instead of merely following the foreign institutional 
funds. The results also support the literature which shows that the presence of foreign 
inVF-stors in a finn are associated \vith higher protitability (Smith et al., 1997; Claessens 
and Djankov, 1999), forcing local tim:s to restructure especially on corporate 
governance and technology faster (Yudaeva et aL, 2000), and higher efficiency resulted 
from higher managerial talent, access to advanced technology, and entry into more 
lucrative produc...'ts and capital markets (D'Souza el aL, 2(01). 
With regard to auditing as a corporate governance mechanism, even though 
lately there has been news that has put auditors under bad light, for example in the 
case of Enron in the USA, as well as the AWA and lllH failures in Australia 
(George and Malane, 2(04), this study indicate; that quality audit can play an 
important role as an effective corporate governance mechanism in Malaysian 
companies. Therefore, the regulators, as well as accounting profes.."ional bodie;, 
should take steps to ensure that audit quality 1..., maintained, and that the 
independence of extemal auditors is also preserved. This will be reflected in 
the reliable and credible audit report, which 1.." one of the sources of reference for the 
users of accounts. 
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Limitations of the study 
The data covers only a one-year period, which is for the year 2002. The purpose of 
using the 2002 data is in order to observe the effec'ts of the new Revamped KLSE 
Listing Requirements which were introduced in 2001. The new listing requirements 
require all listed companies to include in their annual reports a separate statement on 
corporate governance. Unfortunately, the analysis of corporate disclosure in this study 
could not be extended beyond the year 2002. This is due to the analysis of annual 
reports in order to come out with the corporate governance reporting score which was 
time-consuming, espel'ially in ensuring its reliability and consistency A researcher has 
to spend between two to four hours to read and identify the information disclosed in 
each annual report. The results could have been improved if the data were collected 
from a period of longer than a ye..1.r, for example for a four or five-year period. 
The findings of this study are only based on the data. for 2002. Future studies in (his 
area might want to extend the scope of the data from only a one-year period to a few 
years, so that one could have a better understanding of the issues of corporate 
governance especially in an anempt to relate it to certain events, for example the 
introduction of the MCCG in the year 2001 or the introduction of Best Practices in 
Corpora te Disclosure by BMB in July 2004. Throughout the period of three years 
between 2003 and 2005, there could be events, e..<;pecially those assol'iated with the 
corporate governance reform agenda by the authorities (the SC and BMB), that might 
have changed the landscape of corporate governance practices. This includes the 
cessation of Practice Note 4 (PN4) by 31st December 2004 as well as the introduc'tion of 
new Practice Note 17 (pNl7) to replace PN4. 
Lastly, this paper deals only with "one-way" causality running from corporate 
governance mechanisms to performance even though there is evidence of 
"reverse-way" and "two-way" causality in governance literature.. However, given the 
high insider ownership levels of insiders it is unlikely that the "reverse-way" causality 
is present in Malaysia. 
Notes 
L PN4 is a classitication pursuant to tile BlVlB's Listing Requirement", whereby listed 
cmnpanies are required to have an adequate level of tinanci,,j condition in order to warrant 
conti.nued trading and listing' on the Of1icial List of the Exchange_ Starting .from 1 January 
2CK)5, it was replaced by P;-.J17 which extends the criteria of P;-.J4. In this study, P;-.J4 
companies are companies which failed to meet the criteria set out under the Bt\-ffi's "Practice 
;-.Jote ;-.Jo. 04/2001". They are as follows: 
•	 The company ttiled to reporr the deficit in its combined sl12reholders fnllds. 
•	 Receivers or managers have been appointed to manage the asset of the relevant 
companyliL<; subsidiaries properties!as.<;ociate companies. 
•	 Auditors have given a "disclaimer opinion" regarding the companies outlook in the 
company's latest account<;. 
•	 A special manager has been appointed as provided for under the Danaharta ;-.Jasional 
Berhad Management Act 1998. 
2.	 These include OECD White Paper on Corporate (;ovemance in Asia (200,1); the IFAC 
Credibility Report (2m3); Standard and Poors (2000); Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (2001); 
Blue Ribbon Comminee Report of USA (1999); Emst and Young's Report on Corporate 
Govemance (2002); and the Malaysian Code of Corporate C;ovemance (20m). 
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